Our research examines the effect of interdependence on estimation and interpretation of earnings/labor supply equations. We consider the cases of (1) a positive spillover from others' labor supplied and (2) a need for conformity with others' labor supplied.
Introduction
Critics of the economic approach to human behavior sometimes cite models with an atomistic decision maker as excessive abstraction leading to un-informative behavioral implications and inaccurate predictions. Among the reasons economic researchers have avoided models with interdependent agents are complexity and no generally accepted theoretical framework for examining interdependent economic agents (Manski 2000 , Moffitt 2001 , Durlauf and Young 2001 , Durlauf 2004 . Empirically, researchers would need to construct econometric models confrontable with data for testing, and available data sets are typically short on information concerning economic interactions among persons or firms. Still, economic interactions among persons are a fact of life and both microeconomic models and data become more informative by taking greater account of the individual's social group connections in decision making. Our research examines the potential quantitative labor supply effects of two types of interactions in utility, spillover from others' decisions and conformity with others' decisions.
Because the broad topic of social interactions is interesting and important, social interactions have received much recent attention and the literature is growing rapidly (Durlauf and Moffitt 2003) . Many studies recognize that to identify social interactions the researcher must account for the fact that the interdependent behavior potentially creates the problem of simultaneity in the data Angrist and Lang 2002; Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992; Marmoros and Sacerdote 2002; Duflo and Saez 2002; Katz, Kling, and Liebman 2001; Sacerdote 2001; Kremer 1997; Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 1996) . The empirical researcher and policymaker must be cautious, though, when considering evidence of interaction effects because empirical studies may not be informative concerning the reference group identity and in turn not identify the underlying structure of interactions, such as whether it is endogenous, exogenous, or both (Manski 1993 (Manski , 2000 Morgan and Ó Gráda 2000; Moffitt 2001 ).
There is little research addressing identification of social interactions in basic labor market behavior underlying labor supply differences. Recent evidence suggests that a worker's choice of hours worked can depend on average hours worked by social reference group members and that neglecting the interdependence can lead to serious underestimates of the labor supply effects of income taxes or local labor market conditions (Blomquist 1993; Woittiez and Kapteyn 1998; Aronsson, Blomquist, and Sackle n 1999; Weinberg, Reagan, and Yankow 2000) .
Social interactions are of much policy relevance for taxation programs or policies directed toward improving the well-being of the unemployed if the social reference group's mean value affects the outcome of interest to the individual (Blomquist 1993) .
When there are substantial amounts of socially interactive decisions in the form of, say, positive spillovers, then there will be a social multiplier effect to consider in optimal policy design as individuals react to the actions of others Murphy 2000, Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 2002) .
Our research bridges theoretical and econometric considerations in household models where non-ignorable social interactions may be present. We use the popular Stone-Geary utility function, which leads to the easily estimable linear earnings function, and demonstrate that even when we introduce a relatively low level of social interaction in utility it can cause an economically significant effect on an individual's labor supply (and consumption) . Ignoring social interactions can cause a serious bias on the estimated structural (utility function) parameters of interest. We also identify situations when other economic concepts that depend on combinations of biased structural parameters, such as labor supply/consumption derivatives and elasticities, may or may not be accurately estimated. The shifts of the labor supply function are general qualitatively for any utility function with imbedded social utility components and with leisure as a normal good (Grodner 2003) ; the calibrated Stone-Geary utility function lets us quantify the results.
Theoretical Framework
We build on the a flexible treatment of social interactions formulated by Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) , where interactions enter into a model with total utility, V(•), encompassing a social utility term, S(•), and individual utility term, u(•):
Our starting point is the model without interactions (baseline, without S(•)); we then discuss forms of interdependence.
Our focus throughout is on labor supply using the Stone-Geary utility function.
The Stone-Geary has convenient properties for estimating labor supply and consumption expenditures. Because the earnings function is linear in the wage rate and non-labor income, w and Y, and the associated labor supply function is linear in 1/w and Y/w, similar social interactions effects appear in other widely used utility functions (Stern 1986 ).
1 The Stone-Geary has also been shown to be a convenient functional form for studying issues related to intertemporal substitution and risk sharing (Ogaki and Zhang 2001 , Low 2002 , Low and Maldoom 2004 . Stone-Geary utility easily admits social interactions in a natural way through its structural parameters. Kooreman and Schoonbeek (2004) and Abel (2005) prove conditions for the existence of welfare improvements over the market equilibrium case with interdependence and the implied optimal taxes that mitigate negative effects of social interactions.
We begin with the baseline utility function without interactions:
where c is consumption, h is hours worked, θ is the expenditure share on leisure (l = Th, with l being leisure and T being total hours available), h γ is the level of maximum feasible hours of work, and c γ is the minimum necessary commodity consumption.
An econometric advantage of the Stone-Geary (2) is that after maximizing utility with respect to consumption and labor supplied the optimal hours worked imply that earnings are linear in both the variables and parameters (Abbott and Ashenfelter 1976) :
The three parameters of the utility function are exactly identified as estimates of
h c θ γ γ ). We will refer to the earnings function in (3) as the StoneGeary without interactions or, more simply, as the baseline model, which is always the point of comparison. The wage effect on labor supply in our benchmark case is
Because the models quickly become complicated, most theoretical studies involving social interactions use a specific functional form, which can still permit quite general conclusions about social interaction effects (Bernheim 1994 , Akerlof 1997 , Akerlof and Kranton 2000 . The Stone-Geary utility function encompasses much of the previous theoretical research on social interactions and is a convenient objective function for introducing social interactions in a theoretically satisfactory way. We follow the approach known as demographic translating where the demographic characteristics of the individuals reside inside the parameter representing the limit value for hours of work, h γ (Pollak and Wales 1992).
Spillover Effects
We embed the social utility (spillover) effect into the parameter h γ ′ , using the specification suggested by Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) ,
, where h µ is the expectation (perhaps sample mean) of hours worked by the reference group members. The reference group is any set of other individuals in the population to which the person refers when making a labor supply decision. The parameter 1 α represents the importance of social utility (spillover) to the individual so that now
The spillover effect can be viewed as a positive externality generated by the labor supplied in the reference group, where a higher mean of hours worked in the reference group decreases the individual's disutility from working. An obvious way to interpret the spillover effect is that someone feels less pain from working if he or she knows others also work. When the base utility function is Stone-Geary incorporating spillovers from others' work efforts, the wage effect on labor supply is
Note that 2 1 / 0 h w α ∂ ∂ ∂ ≥ so that labor supply spillover effects make the individual's response to the wage more positive than in the absence of spillovers. 
Conformity Effects
Conformity in behavior and attitudes is a fundamental concept in social psychology (Sherif 1935) . The general idea is that individuals tend to conform to broadly defined social norms and the magnitude of response depends on cohesiveness, group size, and social support. 4 Again, we embed the interdependence via the parameter h γ ′′ of the baseline utility function so that
The practical implication of a conformity effect in utility is that the person feels penalized when working a different amount of hours than what is typical for the reference group. Intuitively, because there is a penalty for differing from the conformity value for h, the utility function incorporating conformity in (8) should have a smoothing effect on hours relative to the baseline model. The smoothing effect of conformity should in turn mean that a change in h will have a smaller effect on utility than in the baseline case with an accompanying regression toward the group mean.
The augmented earnings function with a conformity effect is 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
In the case of conformity the spillover effect introduced into the earnings function 
where the terms in curly brackets { } again indicate the basic Stone-Geary model.
Even in the Stone-Geary case the expression for the effect of the wage on labor supplied is lengthy, and without specific assumptions it is impossible to determine the labor supply function effects of conformity compared with the baseline case.
Stone-Geary Utility and Linear Expenditure System with Interactions
Earlier we noted that the Stone-Geary utility function is convenient for its simplicity and relative flexibility. However, most research that includes social 
Exogenous Social Interactions
We now present the details of labor supply with versus without social interactions in utility. We first compute the basic Stone-Geary utility function and then add spillover or conformity. Last we compute the labor supply functions and elasticities. The end product is an enhanced understanding of the relative effect of social interactions in the individual's preferences on the labor supply outcomes. As Appendix A demonstrates, the conclusions in the following sections concerning spillover and conformity are general in that only the magnitudes differ for various functional forms (Grodner 2003) . We select the Stone-Geary utility function form mainly for tractability.
How Social Interactions Shift Labor Supply
We begin by creating results comparable to Blomquist (1993) who computes hours of work for given wage rates and selected magnitudes of interactions. The values for hours of work we will discuss have been computed using the solutions for desired h from the three earnings functions, (3), (6), and (9), with numerical details described in Appendix B. In the case of the baseline model versus spillover, computing labor supply is a straightforward manipulation of the earnings function. In the case of the baseline versus conformity, deriving labor supply involves the solution to the quadratic function for earnings with respect to h.
The three labor supply functions that we examine numerically are
Spillover (rearranged equation (6))
Conformity (positive value after solving the quadratic equation in (9)) 0.005 and twice its value, 2 α = 0.01. 6 It is important to recognize that 1 α and 2 α are not connected; they are totally different parameters governing two separate models of social interactions.
To understand labor supply with social interactions we present our results graphically. Figure 1 shows that spillover creates mostly a parallel rightward shift in the labor supply function where the magnitude of the shift depends on the value of 1 α .
Spillover leads to more labor supplied and a similar wage responsiveness of labor supply with and without spillover. 7 Figure 2 illustrates that conformity causes labor supplied to tend toward the mean of the reference group, h µ . Workers with h < µ h in the absence of conformity work more hours under conformity, and workers with h > µ h in the absence of conformity work fewer hours under conformity. As the importance of conformity in the utility function ( 2 α ) rises, labor supply becomes steeper and less elastic. The conclusions for both spillover and conformity are general in that only the magnitudes differ for various functional forms (Appendix A and Grodner 2003).
Bias When Spillover Is Present
To determine the effect of the unmodeled social interactions in a hypothetical empirical study we first need to consider what kind of data and estimator are to be used.
As a starting point it seems reasonable to assume that the norms individuals refer to may be related to behavior (a) of their own in the past (time series), (b) of other individuals in the present (cross-section), or (c) both (panel data). If the levels of the norms vary across individuals, it means that h µ from (5) or (8) may be group-specific or even individual specific. Each case would require a specific data set and the appropriate estimation technique.
One interesting example is the case of the family members being the reference group for each other (Neumark and Postlewaite 1998) . The idea has both theoretical foundation and reasonably good quality data available for testing it. In a family reference group situation the model would be similar to the approach used in studies of the Rotten Kid Theorem (Becker 1981) . One of the model's predictions is that dividing income equally is usually not family welfare maximizing. In our setup we would consider the effect of the overall family non-work time on each individual's labor supply. The difficulty of the research would be in identifying the effect of the social interaction from the effect of the public good in the household due to the benefits of living together. In his review article Bergstrom (1997) discusses how interactions within the family can affect the behavior of the individuals in the household, Jenkins and Osberg (2002) investigate social interactions within the family as a leisure coordination problem, and Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005) find that Europeans may work less than Americans because of regulations that enable Europeans to take vacations at the same time, which raises the satisfaction from vacations and induces more vacation time.
In the following discussion we assume the simplest possibility: the same norm for every person. It is the most basic case relevant for the cross-sectional data. Although constant h µ may be unrealistic, it is instructive and relatively easy to examine.
When the reference group is the population the relevant comparison point is h µ , which is the same for every person. Because there is no variation in the reference group in our simple example, h µ becomes another parameter in the utility function, so we call it a distorted Stone-Geary. The system in terms of the structural parameters is exactly identified, so the linear labor earnings equation with spillover (6) is
From ( 
8 When the spillover in hours is ignored incorrectly two of the structural parameters are correctly estimated as ( ) 0
The third is not.
Specifically, 
Bias When Conformity Is Present
When there is a conformity effect we cannot solve for the bias in the structural parameters inferred from the estimated regression coefficients of a linear labor earnings function ignoring social interactions. The difficulty in establishing bias analytically happens because the conformity case (9) cannot be solved explicitly for earnings, and the associated labor supply function (12) is non-linear in the wage and non-labor income.
From Figure 2 we can deduce the bias to the coefficients in the labor supply or earnings functions. Because we know that conformity makes labor supply flatter the dependent variable, hours of work, has less variation. In the limit labor supply becomes constant. As a consequence, all coefficients that are not a function of h γ will be zero. In 
Summary: Bias From Ignoring Exogenous Social Interaction
The fact that the bias to the baseline coefficients is different when spillover or conformity effects are present but ignored, underlines the need for a precise modeling of interactions effects. For example, a researcher cannot simply include h µ into the regression to control for the omitted variable bias. If the interactions are exogenous, though, we believe that using a so-called partly linear regression model will suffice to control for social interactions of unknown functional form (Yatchew 2003) .
So far our discussion has taken the expectation of hours worked for others in the 
Endogenous Social Interactions and Economic Policy
For the intuition behind an endogenous µ h consider a worker who, in addition to being directly affected by the social norm in the reference group (in the form of average hours worked), now can also affect the social norm by changing labor supplied (which in turn affects reference group average hours worked). In addition to the direct wage effect there is also an indirect effect through feedback from the other (n -1) members of the reference group. 
Represented more completely in a schematic the social interactions process looks like
... Up to now we have considered the first term in (19) compared to a model that incorrectly ignores exogenous social interactions (equations (11)- (13) and Figures 1 and   2 ). We now turn our attention to the two specific algebraic forms of (19) capturing spillover and conformity. In particular, we numerically examine the relative size of the total effect / h w ∂ ∂ and the exogenous effect Empirically it is critical to identify the social multiplier because a researcher can estimate only ( ) exogenous η correctly (Aronsson et al. 1999) . A researcher can control for exogenous interactions by including a nonlinear function for h µ . In the case of endogenous interactions, one not only needs a nonlinear function of h µ but also worry about the endogeneity of h µ and the degree of the feedback effect.
The Wage Effect When the Spillover Effect Is Endogenous
In the case of spillover with Stone-Geary utility, the social multiplier with endogenous social interaction is 2 1 
We present simulation results for different levels of the spillover effect ( 1 α ) in Table 1 along with the calibrated parameters explained in Appendix B. The social multiplier when there is endogenous spillover increases with the level of interactions, and the increase becomes more than proportional for high levels of interactions, which suggests that the feedback effect works longer or the changes are larger. For spillovers where It is helpful to reinforce the social multiplier under social interactions by considering it graphically in Figure 3 . When we consider the shift of the labor demand curve from D 0 to D 1 , the equilibrium moves from point A to point B (exogenous change:
h B − h A ) and then from point B to point C (endogenous change: h C − h B ). The endogenous change comes from the fact that the exogenous change increased equilibrium labor supply to h B and so the reference hours worked µ h increased also (feedback effect).
Absent exogenous social interactions labor market equilibrium would be at O.
Our measure of the importance of endogenous social interactions in (20), which represents by how much higher the effect of the wage change on the labor supply is when interactions are endogenous than when the interactions are exogenous, is essentially the ratio of the total change to the exogenous change in hours worked, or
in Figure 3 . Moreover, if one uses individual data and does not control for interactions, one will incorrectly observe total change as to h B (multiplier = 1). On the other hand, if one uses aggregate data, one observes correctly the total change as to h C . The logic follows Glaeser et al. (2003) who demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that the level of aggregation can reveal the existence of social interactions in the data. Our discussion also formalizes a point made by Blomquist (1993) who notes that the researcher needs to consider the effect of interdependence when data are disaggregated. 
The Wage Effect When the Conformity Effect Is Endogenous
When there is conformity in the Stone-Geary case the social multiplier with endogenous social interaction is 2 2 2 2
(1 ) 2
We present simulation results for different levels of the conformity effect ( 2 α ) in Table 2 along with the calibrated parameters explained in Appendix B. Notice that the proportionate increases in 2 α as one moves down the first column in Table 2 match the proportionate increases in the social multiplier going down the second column. The social multiplier under endogenous conformity increases proportionally with the level of interactions largely because the wage effect with endogenous conformity does not depend on 2 α .
Implications for Research and Policy
In the presence of endogenous social interaction effects there are two components of the change in hours worked due to a wage change. The first component of interactions is exogenous, which increases the labor supply effect due to the wage changes relative to the situation with no social interactions. The second component is due to the endogeneity of µ h , which further increases the wage effect. The total wage effect that includes endogenous spillover may be large relative to the baseline case of no social interactions, and the bias in labor supply wage effects may be even larger from ignoring social interactions. If the ultimate goal is to use structural parameters of labor supply in simulations of policy, such as income tax reforms, the researcher investigating social interaction effects empirically needs to determine not only whether social interactions are present but also whether they are exogenous or endogenous. When interactions are exogenous the results from a mis-specified model can still be useful for policy evaluations. When interactions are endogenous the results from a mis-specified model can be quite misleading because the researcher cannot correctly identify elasticities (See Aronsson, Blomquist, and Sacklén 1999 for an example). The result is more important because even the introduction of a flexible functional form will not solve the problem.
Not taking into account the multiplier will likely understate the true effect.
If there are exogenous social interactions the individual wage effect will be higher for spillover but the elasticity can be well estimated. If spillovers become endogenous the wage effect on labor supply will be higher than when spillovers are exogenous although 
Conclusion
Our research has provided evidence concerning the possible bias in estimating labor supply that may stem from the situation where there are un-modeled social interactions present. We considered cases of positive spillover and conformity in hours We contend that because a researcher usually uses micro data for demand or supply estimation our insights are of interest to those involved in applied microeconomic studies where social interaction may be present. We have also demonstrated that our work connects to as well as extends established results in the literature and have developed more generally the concept of the social multiplier.
There are different effects on labor supply generated by the different forms that social interactions may take. There is sometimes confusion among economists about the exact meaning of concepts acquired from other disciplines (Manski 2000) , and sometimes economists are not clear that the broad term social interactions may encompass many different types of behavior.
We have attempted to demonstrate the important differences between endogenous and exogenous spillover versus exogenous and endogenous conformity effects in labor supply. The discussion highlights the research value added
from specifying correctly what type of interaction may be present. Our results also warn the applied researcher against using a common econometric specification of interaction effects where the reference group mean is simply included as an additional regressor.
Finally, our results also imply the benefits of trying to identify the correct type of interaction. 2. Such a positive externality is recognized in different contexts in social psychology. Under the rule of reciprocation one feels equally deserving of outcomes in the reference group (Cialdini 1993) . In cultural spillover the more society legitimates long work hours the more people work to gain social approval (Baron and Straus 1989) . In behavioral therapy a person feels relief from trauma when he or she knows that others had similar negative experiences (Hawkins and Eagger 1999) .
Endnotes
3. We can also write (7) more informatively as ≥ . For a game-theoretic approach to social norms and consumption see Young (1998) and Soetevent and Kooreman (2002) .
4. For an interesting recent discussion of the costs and benefits to society of conformity versus non-conformity see Sunstein (2002) . 5. A small value for α1 is close to 0; the limiting value is 1/2172 = 0.00046 because leisure is a normal good.
6. Here a small value for α2 is again close to zero, but there is no obvious maximum.
7. Notice that the point elasticity changes because the person chooses higher hours of work at a given wage. 12. The multiplier computed in Glaeser et al. (2003) at different levels of aggregation can be interpreted in our framework as if only part of the population experienced an exogenous wage change, and the researcher observes the equilibrium somewhere between B and C. When the entire population has the exogenous wage change the multiplier in Glaeser et al. coincides with our total change multiplier so that our result extends theirs.
Appendix A: More General Social Interactions Results
It is useful to consider now whether changes in labor supply due to social interactions hold more generally than the Stone-Geary case. To investigate the generality of our results for spillover and conformity effects rewrite labor supply as a general function of the social utility component For example, if the person works more hours than the reference group he or she will work less under conformity, and the labor supply schedule will be flatter than if no social interactions. More generally, labor supply will pivot around the average hours of the reference group but the exact way depends on the specifics of the underlying fundamentals.
In summary, qualitatively the shifts of labor supply due to social interactions will be the same as in our specific example of the Stone-Geary utility function. The quantitative results depend of the specific utility function and the way social interactions are modeled or how social utility enters total utility.
Appendix B: Calibration
To begin, we need values for the parameters of the utility function: h γ (maximum feasible hours of work), c γ (minimum necessary consumption), θ (proportion of full income implicitly spent on leisure), and the moments of the distributions for the independent variables: Y (non-labor income) and w (hourly wage). We calibrate the model using data from a well-known econometric study that examines the Stone-Geary based labor supply model Ashenfelter 1976, 1979) . 
